The US Experience with Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship by Ginsburg, Jane C.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2010 
The US Experience with Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate 
Relationship 
Jane C. Ginsburg 
Columbia Law School, jane.ginsburg@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jane C. Ginsburg, The US Experience with Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, COLUMBIA 
JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS, VOL. 33, P. 311, 2009-2010; COLUMBIA PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 10-225 
(2010). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1624 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 
Columbia Law School 
Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group 
 
 





THE US EXPERIENCE WITH COPYRIGHT FORMALITIES: 
A LOVE/HATE RELATIONSHIP 





PROFESSOR JANE C. GINSBURG 








Forthcoming, COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE ARTS, vol. 33 No. IV (2010) 
 
Revised, 18 January 2010 
 
The US Experience with Copyright Formalities: 
A Love/Hate Relationship 
 




Copyright formalities – conditions precedent to the existence or 
enforcement of copyright, such as provision of information about works of 
authorship that will put the public on notice as to a work’s protected status 
and its copyright ownership, or deposit of copies of the work for the 
national library or other central authority, or local manufacture of copies 
of works of foreign origin – have performed a variety of functions in US 
copyright history.  Perhaps of most practical importance today, formalities 
predicate to the existence or enforcement of copyright can serve to shield 
large copyright owners who routinely comply with formalities from the 
infringement claims of smaller copyright owners, particularly individual 
authors, who may lack the information or resources systematically to 
register and deposit their works. 
 
This article will first define “formalities,” and then will consider their 
conceptual foundations.  Next, it will examine the U.S. experience with 
formalities, from the first copyright statute of 1790 to the present.  Finally, 
it will consider whether and how the beneficial, information-providing 
role of formalities might be achieved, without engendering forfeitures of 






 Given calls, such as those expressed in some recent copyright scholarship, for a 
return of copyright formalities,1 a reality check might be in order.  The United States has 
                                                 
* Morton L. Janklow Professor of literary and artistic property law, Columbia University School of Law.  
This article is based in part on a report to the Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale (ALAI) at 
its June 17, 2009 Congress; the report was in turn based in part on a lecture given April 20, 2009 at the 
University of Rome 1 La Sapienza, “Protezione del pubblico o trappola per gli autori, le formalità nella 
concezione e nella pratica del diritto d’autore.”  I am grateful to Professors Laura Moscati and Paolo Spada 
for their comments.  Thanks also to David Carson, Esq. and to Professors Lionel Bently, Jessica Litman, R. 
Anthony Reese, and to Professors Joanna Manning and David Williams and the participants in the 
University of Auckland Faculty of Law faculty workshop.  Many thanks for research assistance to Mark 
Musico, Columbia Law School Class of 2011. 
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had de jure or de facto mandatory copyright formalities for over 200 years:  Does our 
experience serve as an inspiration or as a cautionary tale? 
 
Copyright formalities – conditions precedent to the existence or enforcement of 
copyright, such as provision of information about works of authorship that will put the 
public on notice as to a work’s protected status and its copyright ownership, or deposit of 
copies of the work for the national library or other central authority, or local manufacture 
of copies of works of foreign origin – have performed (or are thought to have performed) 
a variety of functions in US copyright history.  First, formalities that condition the 
existence or enforcement of copyright on supplying information about works of 
authorship should enable effective title searching, thus furthering the economic interests 
both of copyright owners and of potential exploiters.2  Second, copyright-constitutive 
formalities, principally notice of copyright, but also at various times deposit, registration 
and renewal, erect a barrier to the existence of protection, concomitantly casting into the 
public domain published works that fail to comply.  These formalities thus (at least in 
theory) have divided works of perceived economic significance worth the effort of 
compliance from the mass of other creations, leaving the latter free for others to exploit.  
Third, formalities with whose compliance protection depends entail additional results, 
probably intended, and in any event certainly foreseeable.  US manufacturing 
requirements, introduced when the US at last extended copyright to works of foreign 
origin,3 served not only local labor interests, but also consigned to the public domain 
foreign works whose authors were unaware that US protection for works of foreign 
creators required the employment of local printers and artisans.  Thus, the international 
copyright protection that Congress belatedly gave with one hand, it may have placed 
substantially out of reach with the other.4  Finally, and perhaps of most practical 
importance today, formalities predicate to the existence or enforcement of copyright can 
serve to shield large copyright owners who routinely comply with formalities from the 
infringement claims of smaller copyright owners, particularly individual authors, who 
may lack the information or resources systematically to register and deposit their works.   
                                                                                                                                                 
1 See Stef van Gompel, Formalities in the digital era: an obstacle or opportunity? (proceedings of the 
ALAI Annual Congress, London, England, June 14-17, 2009), available at 
https://www.alai2009.org/programme.aspx; see also sources cited, infra note 9. 
2 Formalities thus can serve to alleviate the transaction costs of what Prof. Molly van Houweling has called 
“atomistic copyright.”  See Molly Shaffer van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright 
Law 55-56 (August 12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1422016. 
3 An act to amend title sixty, chapter three, of the Revised Statutes of the United States, relating to 
copyrights, 26 Stat. 1106 (1891), sec. 3 (“Provided That in the case of a book, photograph, chromo or 
lithograph, the two copies of the same required to be delivered or deposited as above shall be printed from 
type set within the limits of the United States, or from places made therefrom, or from negatives, or from 
drawings on stone made within the limits of the United States, or from transfers made therefrom”). 
4 The manufacturing clause applied to all books, periodicals, lithographs and photo-engravings, including 
those by US authors.  See 17 U.S.C. § 15 (1909 Act, repealed).  For a summary of the complexities of the 
1891 and 1909 Act manufacturing clauses, starkly illustrating the many pitfalls for foreign, and even some 
domestic, authors, see R.R. BOWKER, COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORY AND LAW 153-61 (1912).  See also 
Elizabeth K. Dunne, Study No. 20, Deposit of Copyrighted Works (1960), reprinted in 1 STUDIES ON 
COPYRIGHT 409, 425 (Arthur Fisher Mem. Ed., 1960) (“It was found almost impossible for foreign authors, 
writing in a foreign language, to complete negotiations for the publication of an American edition of their 
work (as required by the manufacturing clause) prior to publication abroad.”) 
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 Confiscatory formalities, long lamented in US copyright commentary,5 have now 
garnered favor in some quarters, particularly with respect to exploitations on the Internet.  
One hundred years after the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention confirmed the 
automatic vesting of international copyright by forbidding the imposition of copyright-
constitutive or enforcement-predicate formalities on foreign Berne member works, most 
countries have also ceased to require compliance by local authors as well.  With 
formality-free initial protection, any work created, no matter how trivial (so long as 
minimally “original”), automatically enjoys enforceable exclusive rights in every country 
of the Berne Union.  Protection thus “subsists”6 even for casual communications, and 
even though the author may not be a professional creator, and hence may be unaware of 
or indifferent to any copyright in her work.7  On the other hand, the Internet has put vast 
amounts of formal and informal copyrighted content at the de facto (if not de jure) 
disposal of countless users.  A clash between users disinclined, or practically unable, to 
clear rights, and the subsisting rights of authors may seem inevitable.  The relaxation of 
formalities is also evoked as a cause of “orphanage” of works: were registration required, 
then right holders might more easily be found.8   
 
Hence the current vogue for “reformalizing copyright,”9 to return to the author or 
right holder the burden of asserting claims to copyright, and thereby to enlarge the public 
domain with works whose authors do not “care” sufficiently about to mark off their 
ownership.10  In other words, the draconian features of U.S. formalities, once seen as 
deplorable, now in some respects are celebrated.  Whether or not a return to the 
copyright-confiscatory function of formalities is desirable, the United States’ Berne 
obligations would forbid it from imposing a reformalized regime on foreign works.  
Berne’s reservation of domestic protection in the country of origin11 would, however, 
permit the United States to reinstate formalities with respect to U.S. works.  While, as we 
will see, the US has applied a “two-tier” approach to certain enforcement-predicate 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Shira Perlmutter, Freeing Copyright From Formalities, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 565 
(1995); Irwin Karp, A Future Without Formalities, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J 521 (1995). Arthur 
Levine, The End of Formalities:  No More Second-Class Copyright Owners, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J 
553 (1995).   
6 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists in original works of authorship fixed . . .”). 
7 One may, however, dispute the indifference of non professional authors to the subsistence of copyright in 
their works.  To the extent that the use of Creative Commons icons serves as a guide, most users affix icons 
denoting a reservation of copyright control over their works, for example, with over 3/4 of persons posting 
photographs to Flickr adopting the “non commercial” and/or “no derivative works” directions.  See Flickr, 
at http://www.flickr.com/creativecommons/. 
8 Lawrence Lessig, Op-Ed., Little Orphan Artworks, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2008, at A23; David Fagundes, 
Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139 (2009).  See also, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ORGANIZATION, STANDING COMMITTEE ON COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS, THIRTEENTH SESSION, 
SURVEY OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON VOLUNTARY REGISTRATION SYSTEMS FOR COPYRIGHT AND 
RELATED RIGHTS, DOC. SCCR/13/2 4-6 (Nov 9, 2005) (discussing relationship of formalities to orphan 
works). 
9 See, e.g., Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STANFORD L. REV. 484 (2004); James 
Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167 (2005), David Fagundes, Crystals in the 
Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139 (2009). 
10 But see supra note 7. 
11 Berne Conv. art. 5(3 )(“Protection in the country of origin is governed by domestic law.”). 
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formalities, a return to conditioning the existence or persistence of copyright on 
compliance with formalities so significantly increases the discrimination against local 
creators as to be politically problematic.  Moreover, given the ease in the digital era with 
which the country of origin can be manipulated,12 it is not even clear that a two-tier 
regime will in fact burden any but the least informed and least affluent local creators. 
 
 This article will first further define “formalities,” and then will consider their 
conceptual foundations.  Next, it will examine the U.S. experience with formalities, from 
the first copyright statute of 1790 to the present.  Finally, it will consider whether and 
how the beneficial, information-providing role of formalities might be achieved, without 
engendering forfeitures of protection or posing practical impediments to meaningful 
enforcement of copyright. 
 
I.  Formalities in Theory and in Practice: Theory 
 
A. What are, and are not, “formalities”?13 
 
In the sense of the Berne Convention, the formalities that art. 5(2) prohibits 
member States from imposing on foreign authors include “everything which must be 
complied with in order to ensure that the rights of the author with regard to his work may 
come into existence.”14 Thus requirements such as registration, the deposit or filing of 
copies, the payment of fees, or the making of declarations or affixing notices to copies of 
the work, may not be made mandatory preconditions to protection.  But State-imposed 
preconditions on the coming-into-being of the author’s rights represent only part of the 
Berne-targeted formalities.  An author may be vested with copyright, but unable to 
enforce her rights unless she complies with a variety of prerequisites to suit.  Hence the 
addition by the 1908 Berlin Act of the word ‘exercise’, so that then-article 4(2) (now art. 
5(2)) read: “The enjoyment and exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any 
formality.”15 This wording was designed to cover any provision in Member-state law 
that, as distinct from making the recognition of an author’s rights contingent upon 
compliance with some formality, made the bringing of proceedings to enforce these 
rights subject to a formality (perhaps even the same ones as required for the existence of 
protection). For example, the obligation the US Copyright Act imposed on authors to 
register their works with the Copyright Office as a prerequisite to initiating an 
infringement action was deemed inconsistent with the article 5(2) prohibition on 
subjecting the exercise of rights to compliance with formalities.16   
                                                 
12 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “United States work” for purposes of § 411 – pre-suit registration 
requirement; if the work is first published outside the US in another Berne member State and not 
simultaneously published in the US, it is not a “US work”); Berne Conv. art. 3(4). (definition of country of 
origin; “simultaneous” publication occurs within 30 days of first publication) 
13 Portions of this section have been adapted from SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL 
COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND, ¶¶ 6.102-6.105 (2006). 
14 See Actes de la Conférence internationale pour la protection des droits d’auteur réunie à Berne du 8 au 
19 Septembre 1884 43 (1884), discussed in RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 13, ¶ 6.102 (2006). 
15 Berne Conv. art. 5(2). 
16  See Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, reprinted in 10 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513, 569-574 (1986).  The 1988 Berne Convention Implementation Act 
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Nonetheless, not every record-keeping or even litigation-related obligation a State 
imposes should be considered a Berne-banned “formality.”  For example, Berne does not 
require the suspension of local rules of evidence or procedure applicable to all judicial 
proceedings; it targets only copyright-specific measures.17  Thus, a foreign copyright 
holder cannot assert that art. 5(2) dispenses her from paying court fees that attach to the 
filing of any kind of claim, but she may object to payment of a fee imposed only on the 
bringing of a copyright action.   
 
It is also necessary to distinguish between local rules that condition the validity or 
scope of a grant of rights on the formalization of an agreement to transfer rights under 
copyright and rules that limit the exercise of those rights independently of their 
ownership.  The first class of rules –  which  may include such requirements as that the 
transfer be in writing, that it be signed by the author, and that the scope of the grant be 
clearly articulated – are generally designed to protect authors from ignorant or 
improvident transfers.18  The rationale and the effect of this kind of author-protective 
formalism are profoundly different from public-protective formalities, such as notice or 
registration, or copyright-specific litigation hurdles, which seek to shield the public from 
authors’ claims.   In the former instance, the formal rules tell us who is entitled to enforce 
a copyright whose existence the rules do not call into question.  In the latter instance, the 
formalities limit any copyright claimant’s enforcement, and may destroy the copyright 
altogether.  The difference between who owns rights under a copyright, and whether a 
copyright exists or can be enforced, is crucial to determining whether the obligation 
under scrutiny is a Berne-barred “formality.”  Immediately below, and in Part III, we will 
address the consequences of the distinction for the achievement of some of the public-
regarding goals of formalities, through the development of a reliable means of title-
searching.    
 
The characterization as “formalities” of three other copyright-pertinent 
obligations – recordation of transfers, deposit of copies for the Library of Congress, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
accordingly lifted the requirement for non-US Berne works, but retained it for US works.  See Jane C. 
Ginsburg & John M. Kernochan, 102 Years Later: The US Joins the Berne Convention, 13 COLUMBIA-
VLA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS 1, 13 (1988).  The Act did not, however, alter the “incentives” to 
register, such as according prima facie evidentiary value to registrations made within five years of 
publication, and conditioning the availability of statutory damages and attorneys fees on registration before 
the occurrence of the infringement, or within three months of publication, 17 USC secs. 410(c), 412.  See S. 
Rep. No. 100-352, 100th Cong. 2d sess. at 14 (1988) (“while these provisions substantially enhance the 
relief available to the proprietor of a registered work, they do not condition the availability of all 
meaningful relief on registration, and therefore are not inconsistent with Berne”). 
17 See, e.g., CLAUDE MASOUYÉ, WIPO GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION, ¶ 5.5 (1978); U.S. Adherence to 
the Berne Convention: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 72 (1987) (statement of Donald C. Curran, the Assoc. Librarian 
of Congress and Acting Register of Copyrights, Copyright Office). 
18 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (transfers of exclusive rights require a writing signed by the grantor); Code 
de la propriété intellectuelle art. L131-2 (Fr.) (“The performance, publishing and audiovisual production 
contracts defined in this Title shall be in writing.”); Code de la propriété intellectuelle art. L131-3 (Fr.) 
(“Transfer of authors’ rights shall be subject to each of the assigned rights being separately mentioned in 
the instrument of assignment and the field of exploitation of the assigned rights being defined as to its 
scope and purpose, as to place and as to duration.”). 
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conditioning certain remedies on registration - warrants examination.  The U.S. has since 
1802 required that transfers of copyright ownership be recorded.  Most enactments of this 
requirement have not made it a condition to enforcement of the copyright; rather, the 
penalty for failure to record has been invalidity of the transfer in the event of a 
subsequent bona fide purchase, which the later transferee does record.19  Because this 
obligation addresses who may assert copyright ownership, rather than whether the 
copyright exists or may be enforced, a general recordation requirement, carrying the same 
sanctions as those accompanying duties to record other kinds of property, for example, 
title to land,20 would not seem inconsistent with Berne art. 5(2). 
 
By contrast, making recordation a prerequisite to suit, as the US briefly did 
between the implementation of the 1976 Copyright Act and the enactment in 1988 of 
amendments to conform to Berne Convention minima,21 presents a more difficult 
question.  Such a prerequisite does condition the exercise of copyright on compliance 
with an obligation to supply information to a government authority.  But, as indicated 
earlier, a “formality” is copyright-specific.  If recordation of transfers of title were a 
prerequisite to assertion of property rights in general, then one might contend that a 
recordation requirement should be viewed no differently than, for example, general court 
costs (as opposed to special copyright litigation fees), which we have already posited are 
Berne-permissible.  If, however, recordation of title is not generally mandated, a 
copyright recordation prerequisite might still survive Berne scrutiny, on the ground that 
the requirement concerns who may exercise the rights, rather than whether they may be 
enforced at all. 
 
The obligation to deposit copies for the national library does not violate the Berne 
prohibition so long as the penalty for failure to deposit is not tied to the existence or 
enforcement of copyright.  Berne does not prevent member States from requiring authors 
to subsidize a member State’s national library by in effect taxing the local publication of 
foreign authors’ works; thus, a member State may demand deposit and may impose fines 
for failure to comply, so long as any sanctions do not compromise the existence or 
enforceability of the copyright. 
 
Finally, conditioning certain remedies on registration of the work22 may be 
problematic.  Arguably, so long as a Berne Member State leaves basic claims for 
injunctive relief and statutory damages unencumbered by formalities, it may limit the 
availability of enhanced remedies, such as statutory damages, to compliance with 
                                                 
19 See  Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976); Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 
(amended 1870); Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (repealed 1909). 
20 See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 291 (McKinney 2006) (“Every such conveyance [of real property] not 
so recorded is void as against any person who subsequently purchases . . . the same real property . . . in 
good faith and for a valuable consideration, from the same vendor or assignor, his distributees or devisees, 
and whose conveyance, contract or assignment is first duly recorded . . .”); Miller v. Hennen, 438 N.W.2d 
366 (Minn. 1989) (purchaser who first recorded the sale of real property prevails against previous 
purchaser who did not record).  
21 See 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (repealed). 
22 See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (pre-infringement registration of work a prerequisite to obtaining statutory damages 
and attorneys fees), discussed infra Part II.C.2. 
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registration or other obligations.23  However, “the difference between a permissible 
conditioning of an enhanced remedy, and an impermissible conditioning of an effective 
remedy may not always be apparent, thus making the distinction a delicate one in 
practice.”24 
 
B. Conceptual and historical underpinnings 
 
This section will set the question of copyright formalities on the broader stage of 
copyright theory, if only to overturn that platform by examining the history of copyright 
formalities.  Since at least the mid 19th century, commentators have articulated two 
general concepts of copyright, one founded in natural property rights, the other based on 
a State grant of monopoly.  For example, in 1838 Charles-Augustin Renouard, author of 
one of the first French copyright treatises, articulated two opposing philosophies of 
copyright.  According to one, grounded in natural rights conceptions of property, authors 
are the absolute owners of their work, both before and after publication.  Their property 
right is, like all other property rights, transmissible, perpetual, and inviolable.  According 
to the other, social contract-based, system of copyright thought, authors are  
 
[W]orkers and not property owners; if the laws ensure them exclusive exploitation 
of their works, it is by virtue of a positive grant of civil law and of a tacit contract 
which, at the moment of publication, intervenes between the public and the 
author.  It is by the establishment of a privilege, created as a legitimate and fair 
compensation, that the full and free exploitation of a published work is forbidden 
to all persons composing the public.25    
 
From these opposing bases for copyright different attitudes towards formalities might 
follow.  If copyright is essentially a government grant, it might well come with 
conditions.  For example, requiring the author to affix a notice of copyright, or to register 
and deposit copies of the work with a government agency before the right will be 
recognized or enforced, is fully consistent with a social-contractual view of copyright.  
Imposition of formalities thus would reflect the premise that creating the work does not 
alone justify protection: copyright is a quid pro quo, and it is the author's burden properly 
to assert her rights; should she fail to keep her end of the bargain, the innocent public 
should not be liable for unauthorized exploitations.  Formalities thus make free copying 
                                                 
23 See, e.g., REPORT OF AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON US ADHERENCE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION, 
reprinted in 10 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & THE ARTS 513, 572-74 (1986).  See also Football Ass’n. Premier 
League Ltd. v. You Tube, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57438, *10 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2009) (exemption of foreign 
works from pre-suit registration obligation does not extend to prerequisites to obtaining statutory damages; 
the latter registration obligation does not violate the Berne Convention or the TRIPs Accord: “The Senate 
Judiciary Committee concluded that Section 412 and other provisions of the Copyright Act ‘do not 
condition the availability of all meaningful relief on registration, and therefore are not inconsistent with 
Berne.’ S. Rep. No. 100-352, at 14-15.”; in any event, the Berne Convention and TRIPs are not self-
executing in the US); Elsevier BV v. Unitedhealth Group Inc., No 09 Civ. 2124 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 
2010) (.dismissing challenge to sec. 412 because Berne Conv. not self-executing). 
24 RICKETSON AND GINSBURG, supra note 13, at ¶ 6.108. 
25 CH.-A. RENOUARD, DES DROITS DES AUTEURS SUR LES PRODUITS DE LEUR INTELLIGENCE 242 (1838); 
see also AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON COPYRIGHT 10-15 (1899) (distinguishing between 
concepts of copyright as a property right, and as a “privilege.”) 
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the default position; that initial stance should not vary unless the author undertakes to 
warn the world of her claims.  So characterized, formalities clash with a conception of 
copyright as springing from the creative act.  If copyright is a natural property right in the 
fruits of the author’s intellectual labor, then copyright is born with the work, and no 
further action should be necessary to confer or confirm the right.  Hence, a natural 
property rights conception of copyright should in theory eschew formalities.26 
 
Such tidy coherence may be theoretically satisfying, but it is also substantially 
anachronistic.  In historical context, the opposition of natural rights and social contract 
(State-granted monopoly) concepts was much less sharp.  By the same token, the role of 
formalities as exemplifying one or another concept reflects subsequent rationalizations 
more than contemporary experience.  Neither at the beginning of the eighteenth century, 
with the Statute of Anne, nor towards its end, with the US constitution’s copyright clause 
or the first US copyright statute, did lawmakers set out to conceptualize copyright 
exclusively as a natural right, or only as a conditional State grant, or for that matter to 
adopt any overriding theory of copyright.   In the case of the Statute of Anne, the vesting 
of rights in authors rewarded their intellectual labor,27 and the conditioning of an 
additional term of protection on the author’s remaining alive,28 further demonstrates the 
Act’s focus on the rights of authorship.  But the statute also adopted the regulatory 
framework, including registration with the Stationers Company and deposit of copies of 
books with designated libraries, established under the 1662 Licensing Act.29  Arguably, 
Parliament retained the bureaucratic aspects of the pre-copyright printing privileges not 
because its Members carefully conceptualized the nature of copyright, but because the 
prior system was known and had worked.30  In the case of the early US enactments, many 
pre-Constitutional State copyright statutes included preambles with ringing declarations 
of natural property rights,31 but then copied the Statute of Anne almost verbatim, 
                                                 
26 Benjamin Kaplan, Study No. 17, The Registration of Copyright (1958), in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT, 
supra note 4, at 325, 366 (Arthur Fisher Mem. Ed., 1960) (“Those for whom copyright is a ‘natural’ right 
have regarded formalities as repugnant to such a right and therefore offensive in their nature; while those 
who think of copyright as a State-granted, limited ‘monopoly’ have tended to look upon formalities as 
somehow the proper or even the necessary accompaniment of the grant.”); see also SILKE VON LEWINSKI, 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND POLICY, ¶¶ 3.25-3.26 (2008). 
27 Laura Moscati, Un “Memorandum” di John Locke tra Censorship e Copyright, LXXVI RIVISTA DI 
STORIA DEL DIRITTO ITALIANO 69 (2003), has demonstrated a link between Locke’s general theory of 
property rights and his expression of literary property rights, subsequently captured in the Statute of Anne. 
28 The last sentence of the Statute of Anne (§ 11) provides: “Provided always that after the expiration of the 
said term of fourteen years the sole right of printing or disposing of copies shall return to the Authors 
thereof if they are then living for another Term of fourteen years.” 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710). 
29 Id. (providing for pre-publication registration of the book’s title with the Stationers Company, “in such 
manner as hath been usual”).  On registration with the Stationers Company under the 1662 Licensing Act, 
see, e.g., Michael Treadwell, The stationers and the printing acts at the end of the seventeenth century, in 4 
THE HISTORY OF THE BOOK IN BRITAIN 1557-1695 755 (John Barnard & D.F. McKenzie eds., 2002). 
30 See, e.g., JOHN FEATHER, PUBLISHING, PIRACY AND POLITICS: AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF COPYRIGHT IN 
BRITAIN 63 (1994) (the Statute of Anne was generally consistent with past business practice: “For the trade, 
the 1710 Act represented a simple continuation of legal and commercial practices which had developed 
since the middle of the sixteenth century, but which had been under challenge in the absence of any 
statutory authority since 1695.”) 
31 See, e.g., Massachusetts Copyright Statute (1783), in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450-1900), (L. 
Bently & M. Kretschmer eds.), at www.copyrighthistory.org (“. . . as such security [of the fruits of authors’ 
9 
including its requirements of registration and deposit of copies,32 and even including 
language almost certainly irrelevant to the situation of the ex-Colonies.33  The cut-and-
paste character of these statutes belies any consistent reflection on the nature of 
copyright. 
 
Indeed, in the US, authorities throughout the 19th century conveyed highly mixed 
messages regarding the nature of copyright and the role of formalities.  While courts 
(including the Supreme Court) often articulated a rigidly positivistic concept of 
copyright, for which strict adherence to formalities formed a cornerstone,34 treatise 
writers eloquently insisted on the natural rights of authorship, generally treating 
formalities as an administrative afterthought.35  Similarly, the Judiciary Committee report 
accompanying the bill that ultimately became the 1831 copyright amendments, making 
registration of the work before its publication an unambiguous prerequisite to the 
obtaining of federal copyright protection, nonetheless extolled the author’s natural 
entitlement to a property right: “If labor and effort in producing what before was not 
possessed or known will give title, then the literary man has title, perfect and absolute, 
and should have his reward . . .”36   
                                                                                                                                                 
study and industry] is one of the natural rights of all men, there being no property more peculiarly a man’s 
own than that which is produced by the labour of his mind”); North Carolina Copyright Statute (1785), id. 
(“Whereas nothing is more strictly a man’s own than the fruit of his study . . .”); see generally Francine 
Crawford, Pre-Constitutional Copyright Statutes, 23 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 11 (1975). 
32 Crawford, supra note 31, at 23-24, states that the registration requirement was for evidentiary purposes – 
to prove that the claimant was the author or held rights from the author – rather than constitutive of 
copyright protection. 
33 Id. at 15-16 & n.15a .  
34 See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834) (strict compliance with all statutory formalities held a 
prerequisite to the vesting of federal copyright protection for published works); Osgood v. AS Aloe 
Instrument Co, 83 Fed. 470 (C.C..E.D. Mo. 1897) (despite judge’s “disposition much in favor of upholding 
copyrights, and thus securing to authors what seems to be a natural right to the rewards of their own literary 
labors,” holding that author “never acquired a valid copyright” because she failed to fulfill statutory 
obligations to deposit copies of her book with Library of Congress before publication and to insert proper 
notice of copyright on the title-page); see also Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) 
(inferring that a “daily price quote” could not be the subject matter of federal copyright protection because 
its publication was too evanescent to permit compliance with full range of statutory formalities). 
35 See GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 1-25 (Introduction –Theory of 
the Rights of Authors; copyright founded in “general principles of justice and right”), 193-98 (Chapter VI: 
Of the Statute Requisites for a Valid Copyright) (1847); EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 1-20 (Origin and 
nature of Literary Property, especially  p. 13, challenging argument that author’s natural rights cease upon 
publication: “It is a ridiculous doctrine which recognizes a species of property, and yet pronounces its only 
use unlawful and self-destructive”), 262-300 (Statutory Requisites for Securing Copyright) (1879); Stef van 
Gompel, ‘Les formalités sont mortes, vive les formalités! Copyright formalities and the reasons for their 
decline in nineteenth-century Europe’, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF 
COPYRIGHT, (Ronan Deazley, Martin Kretschmer & Lionel Bently, eds., forthcoming 2009) has observed a 
similar pairing of natural rights rhetoric and formalities in 19th-century Continental European copyright 
systems. 
36 H.R. REP. NO. 3 (1830), in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, at 
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-
bin/kleioc/0010/exec/showThumb/%22us_1831%22/start/%22yes%22.  Professor Oren Bracha, in his 
commentary on this Committee Report, suggests that the Committee’s fulsome endorsement of authorial 
property rights reflected the influence of Noah Webster, a tireless advocate of copyright protection, whose 
10 
 
But formalities, and the highly restricted view of copyright they ultimately 
symbolized, came to dominate the US landscape, particularly following the Supreme 
Court’s 1834 decision in Wheaton v Peters.37  The first State and then Federal copyright 
statutes had included formalities modeled on Statute of Anne, but it was not inevitable 
that they be interpreted as constitutive of copyright, as opposed to predicate to special 
statutory remedies.  Indeed, British authorities since the 18th century had confined the 
sanction for non compliance with registration and deposit requirements to restricting the 
author’s or rightholder’s remedies for copyright infringement to those available at 
common law.38   Non compliance did not endanger the existence of the author’s 
copyright.  By contrast, the Supreme Court in Wheaton v. Peters imposed punctilious 
compliance, making post-publication copyright a tributary of the many statutory 
prerequisites.39   
 
Different explanations for the centrality of formalities to Wheaton v Peters’ 
delimitation of US copyright might be ventured.  Given the Framers’ suspicion of 
restraints on competition, statutory formalities could have been perceived as a necessary 
counterweight to the prospect of excessive market power that even a monopoly limited in 
time might engender.40  The statutory institution and judicial requirement of strict 
observance of statutory formalities would suggest that Congress and the courts were far 
more fearful of establishing monopolies than concerned to foster authorship.  The more 
stringent the formalities, the more works freely available in the public domain, and the 
smaller the universe of works over which exclusive rights could be enforced.41  An 
alternative account suggests that the Wheaton court’s embrace of a highly positivistic, 
formality-defined approach to copyright was a necessary corollary of the Court’s 
federalism jurisprudence; after all, Henry Wheaton’s assertion that non compliance with 
federal formalities did not bar his common law copyright claims clashed with the Court’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
son-on-law, Oliver Ellsworth, wrote the Committee Report.  Oren Bracha, Commentary on the U.S. 
Copyright Act 1831 (2008), in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 31, at 
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabeCom/%22us_1831%22 
37 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); see also Shaffer van Houweling, supra note 2, at 27 (citing ZORINA KAHN, 
THE DEMOCRITIZATION OF INNOVATION 245 (2005) (18% of copyright cases from 1790-1909 concerned 
abandonment or forfeiture of copyright for – often minor - failures to comply with formalities)). 
38 See Beckford v. Hood, [1798] 7 TR 620, 101 Eng. Rep. 1164 (K.B.); see also Kaplan, supra note 26, at 
327-35 (providing general survey of English caselaw on formalities). 
39 See 33 U.S. (8 PET.) at 663-64, “No one can deny that when the legislature are about to vest an exclusive 
right in an author or inventor, they have the power to prescribe the conditions on which such right shall be 
enjoyed; and that no one can avail himself of such right who does not substantially comply with the 
requisitions of the law.”  
40 See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson and Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders’ 
View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 
52 EMORY L. J. 909, 941 (2003). 
41 The extent to which the Framers and their immediate successors were in fact as monopoly-phobic as the 
above account implies is subject to some debate.  See, e.g., Thomas Nachbar, Constructing Copyright’s 
Mythology 6 GREEN BAG 2D 37, 45 (2002) (modern scholars’ attribution of anti-monopoly animus to the 
framing of early US copyright laws is overstated); Edward C. Waltersheid, To Promote the Progress of 
Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United 
States Constitution 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 55-6 (1994) (“very few actually gave much thought to” 
Congress’ power to grant copyright monopolies). 
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previous rejection of residual State common law intellectual property rights whose 
assertion undermined Federal control of interstate commerce.42   Formality-free copyright 
was thus a casualty of the Marshall Court’s determination to eliminate barriers to 
interstate trade and to consolidate Federal power.43  In the light of the Court’s federalism 
jurisprudence, Justice Joseph Story’s perhaps otherwise surprising alignment with the 
Wheaton majority becomes more readily understandable.  Although Justice Story was an 
advocate of broad copyright protection,44 and may have been sympathetic to Wheaton’s 
common law copyright claims, he was also “greatly concerned with the development of 
[the Court’s] jurisprudence as a tool of national power,”45 and had joined or authored the 
Court’s principal federalism decisions.46 
 
II. US Formalities in Practice 
 
Whatever their conceptual foundation, formalities in practice dominated 19th and 
20th century US copyright law, their extent and complexity often proving a trap for the 
unwary.47  It is important to emphasize, however, that those “ensnared” could as well (if 
perhaps not as often) be exploiters as authors, at least when incompletely or incorrectly 
fulfilled formalities misled the user into believing the work unprotected.48  Users might 
draw unreliable conclusions regarding a work’s status because, notwithstanding the 
legacy of Wheaton v Peters, some courts, endeavoring to avoid forfeitures of copyright 
(particularly following enactment of the 1909 Act), interpreted (or interpolated into) the 
statute some tolerance for substantial, albeit imperfect, compliance.49  
 
But not all courts were equally forgiving, as others persisted in requiring strict 
fulfillment of all statutory conditions.  As a result, the legal norm became increasingly 
incoherent and unpredictable.  The doctrine of “limited publication” further complicated 
the situation.  Formalities were required for works which had been, or were about to be, 
published.  Until the 1976 Copyright Act, an unpublished work, as a chattel, remained the 
                                                 
42 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Une Chose Publique?: The Author’s Domain and the Public Domain in Early 
British, French and US Copyright Law, 65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 636, 662-66 (2006). 
43 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (holding commerce clause prevailed over any residual State 
power to grant patent monopolies on steamboat traffic). 
44 See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, ¶¶ 930-44 (1839); see generally, 
R. Anthony Reese, The Story of Folsom v. Marsh, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 259 (Jane C. 
Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006). 
45 See Craig Joyce, The Story of Wheaton v. Peters: “A Curious Chapter in the History of Judicature”, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES, supra note 44, at 36, 41. 
46 In addition to Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, see, e.g., Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816). 
47 See generally Vincent A. Doyle, George D. Cary, Marjorie McCannon & Barbara Ringer, Study No. 7, 
Notice of Copyright (1957), reprinted in STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4, at 229; Kaplan, supra note 
26.  
48 See Washingtonian Pub. v. Pearson, 98 F.2d 245, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1938), rev’d, 306 U.S. 30 (1939) (if 
failure “promptly” to deposit work following publication does not invalidate copyright, then the formality 
becomes “a mere snare for the unwary, who were foolish enough to rely upon absence of registration as 
showing absence of copyright.”  Nonetheless the Court held the deposit, which occurred more than two 
years [published Dec 1931, deposited 21 Feb 1933] after publication, met the statutory standard of 
promptness). 
49 See generally Doyle et al., supra note 47, at 237-49; Kaplan, supra note 26, at 346-51. 
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object of formality-free common law rights50  “Unpublished,” however, did not mean 
unexploited or undivulged.  Public performance of a work did not “publish” it, and 
therefore did not subject it to formalities, even if the performed work had been widely 
seen.51  Borrowing from old English decisions holding that a public performance was not 
a “publication,”52 US courts elaborated a parallel universe of “unpublished” works. The 
rather strained notion of publication was motivated in large part by courts’ awareness 
that, were the work to be deemed “published,” and had the author not complied with all 
applicable federal statutory formalities, the work would go into the public domain, and all 
protection, state or federal, would be lost.53    
 
The following chart summarizes the formalities in force under various copyright 
laws, from the Statute of Anne and the first Copyright Act to the present.   
                                                 
50 The 1976 copyright act abolished the publication threshold for entitlement to federal copyright, which 
now “subsists” as of the creation and fixation of the work, see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
51 See, e.g., Estate of Martin Luther King v. CBS, 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999) (“I Have a Dream” speech 
technically “unpublished” despite delivery before live audience of thousands, and television and radio 
broadcast to millions); see generally William S. Strauss, Study No. 29, Protection of Unpublished Works, in 
STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4, at 189. 
52 See Macklin v. Richardson, [1770] Amb 694, 27 Eng. Rep. 451 (Ch.); Coleman v. Walthen, [1793] 5 TR 
245, 101 Eng. Rep. 137 (K.B.); Morris v Kelly, [1820] 1 Jac. & W. 481, 37 Eng. Rep. 451 (Ch.). 
53 Courts’ efforts to avoid forfeitures may also explain the somewhat tortured US caselaw relating to sound 
recordings, see Strauss, supra note 51, at 202-04.  In this instance, two different forfeitures loom, first of 
the recorded musical composition, and second of the recorded performance.  Under the 1909 Act regime, if 
sale of phonograms constituted “publication,” and the recorded composition had not previously been 
published with notice or registered, then the sale of the recording would cast the composition into the 
public domain.  With regard to the recorded performance, sound recordings were not included within 
federal copyright subject matter until 1972.  Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971), as amended  by Pub. 
L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974) (federal protection for sound recordings fixed and published with 
notice on and after Feb. 15, 1972).  As a result, were pre-1972 recordings deemed “published,” they would 
have immediately gone into the public domain.  Hence the judicial rulings that the sale and distribution of 
phonograms did not “publish” the performances, which, accordingly, remained subject to common law 
copyright.  See Capitol Records v. Naxos of America, 4 N.Y.3d 540 (2005); Capitol Records v. Mercury 
Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955). 
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A.  Formalities in Practice: 1909 Act54 
 
1. Threshold Criterion: Publication.  
 
As indicated earlier, the pivot of the 1909 law was the concept of "publication." 
This event was generally the dividing line between common law protection on the one 
hand and either statutory or no protection on the other. Thus publication with the 
prescribed copyright notice obtained statutory copyright, while publication without such 
notice placed a work in the public domain.  This rule was anchored in the text of section 
9 of the 1909 Act, which provided: "any person entitled thereto by this title may secure 
copyright for his work by publication thereof with the notice of copyright required by this 
Act."55  The concept of "publication" as utilized in section 9 developed into a rather 
technical construct; it was not always coterminous with the general notion of "making 
public," nor even with the act that divests the author of common law rights. 
 
The 1909 Act did not expressly define "publication." This omission was 
apparently based on the assumption that a general definition of this concept was too 
difficult.56  Section 62, however, provided that in the case of a work "of which copies are 
reproduced for sale or distribution," "the ‘date of publication’ shall . . . be held to be the 
earliest date when copies of the first authorized edition were placed on sale, sold or 
publicly distributed by the proprietor of the copyright or under his authority."57 
 
Without a coherent concept of "publication" under the 1909 Act, a number of 
rather arbitrary distinctions emerged. Among the most well known – and most important 
– was the generally accepted rule that the public performance of a spoken drama did not 
constitute publication. This rule was established under the pre-1909 law,58 and was 
applied by analogy to the exhibition of a motion picture,59 the public performance of a 
musical composition, whether for profit or not,60 and the oral delivery of a lecture or 
address,61 all irrespective of the methods employed, including radio broadcasting.62 
                                                 
54 Subsections A and C are in part adapted from ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: 
CASES AND MATERIALS, chs. 4 & 5 (7th ed. 2006). 
55 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (repealed 1976). 
56 Hearings on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before Committee on Patents, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (June 1906). 
57 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1075, 1087 (repealed 1976).  As noted by the court in 
Cardinal Film Corp. v. Beck, 248 F. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1918), the section was evidently intended to fix the date 
from which the term of copyright should begin to run for such a work, rather than to provide a general 
definition of what should constitute publication in all cases. 
58 Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912). 
59 See, e.g., De Mille v. Casey, 121 Misc. 78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.1923). 
60 See, e.g. McCarthy v. White, 259 F. 364 (S.D.N.Y.1919). 
61 See, e.g., Nutt v. National Institute, Inc., 31 F.2d 236 (2d Cir.1929). 
62 See, e.g., Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir.1936).   
Under the 1909 Act, considerable uncertainty was also created as to the effect of publication of a 
derivative work – such as a reproduction of a work of art, or the motion picture based on a novel – on the 
status of the underlying work on which it is based. Compare Rushton v. Vitale, 218 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.1955), 
with Leigh v. Gerber, 86 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y.1949). In Batjac Prods. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 
160 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir.1998), the Ninth Circuit held that "a common law copyright in the underlying 
screenplay does not survive the motion picture's loss of copyright and falls into the public domain due to a 
16 
Because disclosure or communication of a work to another person did not always 
amount to "publication" under the 1909 copyright law, restricted communication of the 
contents of a work was generally held not to be a publication of the work. Distribution 
with limitation by the proprietor of the persons to whom the work was communicated and 
of the purpose of the disclosure was long known as "limited," "restricted," or "private" 
publication, but was, more accurately, no “publication” at all.63 The distinction between 
limited and general publication under the 1909 Act was complicated even further by the 
distinction between "divestive" and "investive" publication. The former described 
dissemination that lost common law copyright; the latter described dissemination, with 
copyright notice, that triggered statutory copyright – and, out of concern for forfeitures, 
courts more readily found the latter than the former.64 
 
In sum, although publication triggered statutory formalities, the statutorily-
undefined concept of “publication” remained elusive, thus compromising the prospect of 
a clear dividing line between works still entitled to common law protection or qualifying 
for federal protection on the one hand, and works dedicated to the public on the other 
hand.  Judicial reluctance to avoid forfeitures, while inconsistently acted-upon, 
undermined the efficacy of copyright-constitutive formalities in consigning to the public 
domain publicly-disclosed works which had not properly complied with the various 
statutory formalities.  At the outset, then, one of the signal goals of the US system of 
formalities was, to say the least, imperfectly realized. 
 
2. The Notice Requirement.  
 
Once a work was deemed "published," the 1909 Act – as did all of its forebears 
from 1802 – required the placement of a copyright notice in a specified location.65  The 
required form of notice was set forth in section 18, which (with some minor exceptions) 
provided for the word "copyright" (or abbreviation) or the familiar copyright symbol, the 
name of the copyright proprietor and the year of publication. Section 19 mandated the 
location of the notice – for a book, "upon its title-page or the page immediately 
following"; for a periodical, "either upon the title-page or upon the first page of text of 
each separate number or under the title heading"; and for a musical work "either upon its 
title-page or the first page of music."66 
                                                                                                                                                 
failure to renew the movie's copyright." Bajtak, 160 F.3d at 1225; accord Shoptalk, Ltd. v. Concorde-New 
Horizons Corp., 168 F.3d 586 (2d Cir.1999) (publication of motion picture "The Little Shop of Horrors" 
published as much of the film's screenplay as was disclosed in the film); Harris Custom Builders, Inc. v. 
Hoffmeyer, 92 F.3d 517, 520 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1114 (1997) (publication of 
architectural drawings publishes underlying plans); Classic Film Museum, Inc. v. Warner Bros., Inc., 597 
F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1979) (publication of motion picture publishes underlying screenplay to the extent the 
movie incorporates the screenplay). 
63 See White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 957 (1952). 
64 See, e.g., Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Post Pub'g Co., 27 F.2d 556, 558 (D. Mass. 1928) (sale of proof copy 
of magazine to publisher's treasurer held investive publication "in so far as the statutory formalities are 
concerned"). 
65 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 19, 35 Stat. 1075, 1079 (repealed 1976).  On the history of the notice 
requirement, see generally R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in US Copyright Law: A History, 30 
COLUM J. L. & THE ARTS 133, 148-54 (2007). 
66 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 19, 35 Stat. 1075, 1079 (repealed 1976). 
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Some courts were prepared to overlook minor departures from the form and 
location requirements of the 1909 Act, provided there was substantial compliance. This 
was particularly true if a technically inaccurate corporate or partnership name was used, 
but was close enough to the name of the true copyright proprietor (e.g., a company with 
identical officers) such that no one could reasonably claim to have been misled. But other 
courts were more punctilious, operating on the theory that the copyright was a special 
legislative privilege that could be secured only through full compliance with formalities. 
Although a notice accompanying the masthead of a periodical (typically on the editorial 
page of a newspaper) was commonly regarded as satisfactory, it was, for example, held 
that it was improper to place the copyright notice on the back cover of a 28-page 
pamphlet; such a defect was regarded as fatal, and the work was thrust into the public 
domain.67  Similarly, courts could be strict about the placement of the notice on a journal 
or other collective work, holding that such notice would not protect included works that 
were authored by others and that did not carry a separate copyright notice.68 
 
Inaccuracies in the year date placed in the notice could also be fatal to the 
copyright. The general rule that developed, through judicial decisions and Copyright 
Office regulations, was that an inaccurately early date was not fatal, but the beginning of 
the statutory term would be reckoned from that year (so as to shorten the term of 
protection, for the benefit of the public). Notice that was postdated by more than one year 
(thus allowing for end-of-the-year slippage in publication schedules), however, was 
regarded as fatally defective.  Of course, if the required notice was altogether omitted, 
that too was fatal. The statute itself, however, in section 20, allowed of one exception: 
when the copyright owner had "sought to comply" with the notice provisions but "by 
accident or mistake" had omitted the notice "from a particular copy or copies."69 That 
oversight would not invalidate the copyright, but would "prevent the recovery of damages 
against an innocent infringer who has been misled by the omission of the notice."70  
Another issue that divided the courts was whether U.S. copyright was lost, under the 
1909 Act, when a work was first published without a notice of copyright outside of the 
U.S. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has consistently since 1996 answered 
that question in the negative.71  
                                                 
67 See J.A. Richards, Inc. v. New York Post, 23 F.Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1938). 
68 See e.g., Sanga Music Inc. v. EMI Blackwood Music, Inc., 55 F.3d 756 (2d Cir.1995). 
69 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 20, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (repealed 1976). 
70 This statutory exception, however, was held not to apply if the omission of notice was through "neglect 
or oversight," Sieff v. Continental Auto Supply, 39 F. Supp. 683 (D. Minn.1941), or through a mistake of 
law, Wildman v. New York Times Co., 42 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). 
71 See, e.g., Twin Books Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 83 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1996).  In Twin Books, the literary 
work, "Bambi, A Life in the Woods," was first published without notice in Germany in 1923, and then 
republished with notice in 1926 (and registered for U.S. copyright). The copyright owner renewed the 
copyright in 1954, which would have been too late had the work's first publication been in 1923. The court 
noted some early decisions which indicated that publication abroad without notice forfeits the possibility of 
securing copyright through a later U.S. publication, but the court concluded that such a view conflicted 
with the prevailing doctrine of "territoriality" of the copyright law. The Ninth Circuit relied upon Heim v. 
Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946), for the proposition that publication abroad without 
notice – in a nation that does not place the work in the public domain for that reason – will not prevent 
subsequently obtaining a valid U.S. copyright.  The Ninth Circuit has recently reasserted its adherence to 
18 
 
In sum, while the notice formality marked the dividing line between protected and 
public domain works, inconsistencies in its application blurred the boundary.  Moreover, 
the willingness of some courts to accept “substantial compliance” may have achieved 
individually just results at the cost of systemic unpredictability.   
 
3. Deposit and Registration 
 
 Under the 1909 Act, registration was not a prerequisite to federal protection during 
the initial 28-year term of copyright, although it was necessary to have registered the work 
and deposited copies before bringing an infringement action.72  On the other hand, section 
13 of the Act required that copies of the work be deposited “promptly” following 
publication, thus posing the question whether failure to deposit copies shortly after 
publication would strip the author or rightowner of the copyright that would have vested 
upon publication with notice.  It was ultimately held, however, that failure promptly to 
deposit copies did not divest the copyright but would bar the rightholder from bringing suit 
until deposit was made.73   
 
While not initially constitutive of copyright, registration was a prerequisite to 
obtaining a second statutory term of 28 years.  The renewal term could be claimed by the 
author if he or she survived the initial term (or at least until the date in the 28th year when 
renewal was sought). If the author had died, then the right to claim the renewal passed 
successively to three other statutory beneficiaries – the surviving spouse or children, or for 
lack of those the author's executor, or in the absence of a will the author's next of kin. The 
renewal term came into being only if an initial application for registration, and then an 
application for renewal registration, were filed with the Copyright Office.  The registration 
prerequisite to renewal had the effect of limiting the duration of most copyrights to 28 
years.74  Most non renewals probably reflected the rights owners’ determinations that the 
works no longer had commercial value justifying the effort and expense of renewal, but 
some non renewals likely resulted from failure to keep track of when renewal was due, or 
from other inadvertence or ignorance.75  Thus, the renewal formality ensured early entry 
into the public domain of the bulk of works initially protected for 28 years, but at the cost 
of divesting those authors (most likely, individual and foreign authors) who may have 
wished protection but failed correctly to fulfill statutory requirements. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Twin Books, see Succession Guino v. Renoir, 549 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2008) (sculptures published in France 
without copyright notice in 1917 and 1974). 
72 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 12, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078 (repealed 1976). 
73 Washingtonian Pub. v. Pearson, 98 F.2d 245, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1938), rev’d, 306 U.S. 30 (1939). 
74 See Barbara Ringer, Study No. 31, Renewal of Copyright, in STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4. 
75 See, e.g., Statement on the floor of the House of Representatives in connection with Pub. L. 102-307, 106 
Stat. 264 (substituting the equivalent of a single 75-year term for the prior dual terms, by making the second 
term – 28 plus 19 years – vest without filing for renewal): "The renewal requirements are highly technical 
and have resulted in the unintended loss of valuable copyrights. In addition to countless individuals who do 
not have knowledge of the requirements, even famous directors such as Frank Capra have fallen victim. 
Capra's 'It's a Wonderful Life,' starring Jimmy Stewart and Donna Reed, went into the public domain when 
the film production company that owned the copyright went bankrupt and no one was around to file the 
renewal application."  Reprinted in GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 54, at 423-24. 
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B.  Interlude: 1925 Bill to Amend the US Copyright Act to Join the Berne 
Convention 
 
 The US stance on formalities long precluded its membership in the Berne 
Convention.  During the 1920s, the efforts of the then-Register of Copyrights Thorvald 
Solberg and of the Authors League and the American Society of Composers Authors and 
Publishers, led to a 1925 bill “to amend and consolidate the acts respecting copyright and 
to permit the United States to enter the International Copyright Union.”76  The 
cornerstone of this bill was the automatic, formality-free vesting of copyright upon 
creation of the work.  Its advocates characterized the then-current law’s obligation to 
comply exactly with technical requirements as a “rather primitive situation,”77 and as 
“restrictions on the fundamental rights and privileges of the author and composer which 
should come away.”78   
 
The concept of automatic copyright, however, encountered considerable 
skepticism from some lawmakers and fierce opposition from copyright-exploiting 
industries, particularly the league of motion picture theaters and the producers of 
phonograph records and piano rolls,79 for whom formalities combated expansive 
assertions of authors’ rights and formed a bulwark against unanticipated liability.  Some 
of the objections voiced against formality free copyright seem drearily prescient of the 
claims of today’s “Copyleft.”  For example, Representative William Hammer, Democrat 
of North Carolina, exclaimed, “Do you mean to chain human thought so that in the Free 
America, just by signing the author’s name, an article can not be printed in a newspaper 
without infringing upon a copyright?  Is that the kind of law you are asking us to 
enact?”80  Similarly, the entrepreneurs of new technological modes of exploitation then, 
as now, sanctimoniously strained to equate their profits with the public interest.  Thus the 
president of the association of Motion Picture Theater Owners declared, “Congress 
should grant no copyright privilege which would have any tendency to inhibit the 
activities or interfere with the progress of great agencies like the motion-picture screen 
and the newspaper that are of such consequence to the general welfare of the people of 
the United States.”81   
                                                 
76 Perkins Bill, H.R. 11258, 68th Cong., (2d sess. 1925).  The 1924 Dallinger Bill proposed similar reforms.  
77 Hearings Part I on H.R. 11258, 68th Cong. 14 (Jan. 22, 1925) (statement of Thorvald Solberg, Register 
of Copyrights). 
78 Id. at 19. 
79 Id. at 136 et seq. (Victor Talking Machine Co.) (bill would “create an undisclosed monopoly”); Hearings 
Part II on H.R. 11258, 68th Cong. 227 et seq. (Feb. 3, 1925) (Music Industries Chamber of Commerce) 
(“The sponsors of the proposed legislation apparently have no concern for those members of the American 
public who would thereby be subjected to great and unavoidable danger of infringement claims by 
foreigners.”) 
80 See Hearings Part I on H.R. 11258, supra note 77, at 68. 
81 Id. at 113.  Some Members of Congress seemed particularly unmoved by pretensions of this kind, as in 
this colloquy between Mr. Paine of the Victor Talking Machine Company and Rep. Hammer of North 
Carolina:  
Mr. Paine.  The position that we take is to come down here and urge this committee not to put 
copyright users at the peril of making infringements of copyrighted works when they know 
nothing about the copyrights.   
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It would take the US another fifty years to adopt and (partially) implement the 
Berne principle that exclusive and enforceable authors’ rights arise with the creation of 
the work.  The toll of the earlier debates is apparent.  Later reformers recognized that 
Solberg’s natural rights advocacy could not prevail in the intense debates that defined 
copyright reform in the 1920s.82   The Report of the Register of Copyrights on the general 
revision of the US Copyright Law that led to the 1976 Act did not endorse “automatic 
copyright.”  Proceeding from the general premise that “where [the author’s and the 
public’s interests] conflict, the public interest must prevail,”83 the Register concluded that 
the notice requirement served the public interest by “keeping free of copyright 
restrictions the great bulk of published material in which the authors do not wish to 
secure copyright.”84  The Report instead recommended retention of the notice 
requirement, but with a five-year grace period for curing inadvertent omissions of notice 
from published copies of works. 
 
C.  Formalities in Practice: The 1976 Act  
 
The principal conceptual and practical innovation of the 1976 Act was to bring 
published and unpublished works under a single federal regime, thus making creation of a 
fixed copy of the work – rather than publication with notice – the starting point for 
federal protection.  But, while the 1976 Act was intended to bring the US closer to the 
Berne Convention,85 it did not at first fully adopt the post-Berlin system of automatic, 
formality-free copyright.  Rather, if copyright attached upon creation and fixation of the 
work, it could detach – and the work fall into the public domain – if the author upon 
publication failed to affix a notice of copyright, and failed to cure that omission within 
the time period allowed by the statute. 
 
1. Publication and Notice 
 
Thus publication remained a key concept in US copyright law, but the 1976 Act, 
unlike its predecessors, included a definition of publication.  Section 101 defined 
publication as: 
 
The distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other 
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute 
copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, 
public performance, or public display, constitutes publication. A public 
performance or display of a work does not itself constitute publication. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mr. Hammer. From a purely humanitarian standpoint of the pubic good, not your own private 
interest? 
Id. at 296. 
82 See Abe A. Goldman, Study No. 1, The History of U.S.A. Copyright Law Revision from 1901 to 1954, in 
STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4, at 1113. 
83 See REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL RIVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 
ch. 1, in STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 4. at 1206. 
84Id.  at1263-64. 
85 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 135-36 (1976). 
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This definition resolved many of the problems that arose by virtue of the definitional 
vacuum in the 1909 Act, particularly by providing that a public performance or display of 
a work is not a "publication" that entails a copyright notice, but that the public 
distribution of phonograph records does constitute publication of the recorded work (as 
well as of the sound recording).86 A definition of publication clarified what acts triggered 
the notice obligation.  For despite the US’ drawing closer to Berne, the 1976 Act retained 
a modified version of the notice requirement.  Among the issues most hotly debated 
during the comprehensive revision of the 1909 Copyright Act leading up to the 1976 Act 
was the continued imposition of a requirement to place copyright notice on "published" 
works and the sanction for a failure to do so. Congress initially decided to retain the 
notice requirement but to make less draconian the consequences of an error or omission, 
in particular allowing for a five-year grace period for registration of the work with the 
Copyright Office, and efforts to add notice to copies after the omission was discovered, as a 
cure for omission of notice.  This sort of splitting the difference between the Berne system 
of automatic formality-free copyright, and the conditional copyright of prior US 
enactments arguably served the goals of neither regime.  A system of defeasible 
copyright could not reliably alert potential users as to a work’s public domain status 
because absence of the notice from published copies no longer cast the work immediately 
into the public domain; a user would have to wait five years and interrogate registration 
records before being able to conclude that the work was no longer under copyright.  But 
the system could still penalize authors who neglected the notice and then failed to make 
timely registration by divesting them of their copyrights after five years. 
 
 The notice requirements were set forth in Sections 401 and 402 of the 1976 Act. 
Section 401 applied to "copies" of published works, and Section 402 to "phonorecords."  In 
1988, in order to permit United States adherence to the Berne Convention, Congress 
eliminated the copyright notice as a precondition to copyright protection. Nonetheless, in 
part because it was difficult to break with such a longstanding practice as the use of 
copyright notice – and in part because Congress and the Copyright Office continued to 
believe that notice served useful purposes in warning unauthorized users and in conveying 
information –  the Berne Implementation amendments to the 1976 Act continued to provide 
incentives to copyright owners to avail themselves of what has, since March 1, 1989, 
become merely a discretionary option to use the notice on published works. 
 
                                                 
86 Nonetheless, the 1976 Act did not succeed in dispelling all confusion or uncertainty regarding use of the 
notice. For example, almost 70 years after White-Smith Music Pub'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908), 
Congress still declined to equate recordings with copies. Thus, in this definition and throughout the statute, 
one notes the refrain "copies or phonorecords." And, as will be noted below, there is no provision for use of 
a ©  copyright notice on phonorecords pertaining to the underlying recorded work. (There is a provision for 
a P notice pertaining to the recorded performance under § 402.) And, while the statute uses "copies" and 
"phonorecords" in the plural, the committee reports state that under this definition "a work is 'published' if 
one or more copies or phonorecords embodying it are distributed to the public."  S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 121 
(1976); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 138 (1976) (emphasis added). But Chairman Kastenmeier of the House 
subcommittee stated on the House Floor that "in the case of a work of art, such as a painting or statue, that 
exists in only one copy ... [i]t is not the committee's intention that such a work should be regarded as 
'published' when the single existing copy is sold or offered for sale in the traditional way – for example, 
through an art dealer, gallery, or auction house." 122 CONG. REC. 31,980 (1976). 
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 After Berne adherence, the amended 1976 Act provided that, for works first 
published on or after March 1, 1989 – and also for copies or phonorecords distributed 
after that date of works that had been published previously – Sections 401(a) and 402(a) 
no longer require placement of notice on publicly distributed copies and phonorecords, 
but instead provide that the © notice "may" be placed on copies and the P-in-a-circle 
notice "may" be placed on phonorecords of sound recordings.87 The form and placement 
of the optional notice are as they were previously when the notice was mandated.88 The 
incentive provided for use of the notice was set forth in a new subsection (d) to Sections 
401 and 402, which disallow an innocent infringement defense if the requisite notice 
“appears on the published copy or copies to which a defendant in a copyright 
infringement suit had access.”89  The incentive is rather weak, however, because the 
innocent infringer defense applies only to the calculus of statutory damages; it affects 
neither actual damages nor the existence of liability.90   
 
The question has arisen whether the copy “to which a defendant . . . had access” 
means the source copy for the infringing act, or generally available copies, whether or not 
such a copy was the one from which the defendant copied.  In BMG v Gonzales,91 the 
defendant downloaded numerous recorded songs from the Internet.  She sought a 
diminution of statutory damages on the ground that the copies from which she copied did 
not bear a copyright notice.  Recognizing that unauthorized source copies may often lack 
copyright notice or other copyright owner-identifying indicia, the court rejected 
defendant’s contention:  
 
It is undisputed that BMG Music gave copyright notice as required – "on the 
surface of the phonorecord, or on the phonorecord label or container" (§ 402(c)). 
It is likewise undisputed that Gonzalez had "access" to records and compact disks 
bearing the proper notice. She downloaded data rather than discs, and the data 
lacked copyright notices, but the statutory question is whether "access" to 
legitimate works was available rather than whether infringers earlier in the chain 
attached copyright notices to the pirated works. Gonzalez readily could have 
learned, had she inquired, that the music was under copyright.92    
                                                 
87 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(a), 402(a). 
88 Under § 404(a), a notice of copyright applicable to a collective work as a whole suffices as notice for the 
separately-owned contents of the collective work, although the authors or copyright owners of these 
contributions may also affix separate notices.  Section 404 carries over the practice of “blanket notice” 
which courts held preserved the copyrights in contributions to collective works published under the 1909 
Copyright Act.  See, e.g., Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that blanket 
notice “is sufficient to obtain a valid copyright on behalf of the beneficial owner, the author or proprietor” 
under 1909 Act (quoting Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397, 399 (2d Cir. 1970))), aff’d 
sub nom. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).. 
89 As to whether continued use of the notice may be expected once no meaningful sanctions attach to its 
omission, see H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 26 (1988) ("It is entirely possible that elimination of the notice 
formality may not in the end curtail its use. Old habits die hard; it remains useful under the Universal 
Copyright Convention; and, it is, in all probability, the cheapest deterrent to infringement which a 
copyright holder may take."). 
90 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(d), 504(c)(2).  
91 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005). 
92 BMG, 430 F.3d at 892. 
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 It is important to remember that the Berne Implementation amendments 
concerning notice do not apply retroactively.  Thus, as to copies or phonorecords first 
distributed before the amendments’ effective date of March 1, 1989, one must still 
ascertain whether notice was properly affixed.  With respect to copies distributed without 
notice between 1978 and February 1989 (inclusive), it is necessary to determine whether 
the omission was discovered and cured within five years of initial publication, and 
whether the copyright owner made reasonable efforts to add notice to after-distributed 
copies.93   
  
2. Deposit and Registration 
 
 Sections 407 through 412 of the 1976 Act enact a modernized administrative 
scheme with the dual purpose of enriching the resources of the Library of Congress and 
providing a comprehensive record of copyright claims. The former is achieved in section 
407, which prescribes a mandatory system of deposit as to published works for Library 
purposes with administrative flexibility as to implementation and realistic sanctions for 
noncompliance under section 407(d) (not including forfeiture of copyright). The latter is 
embodied in a "permissive" registration provision, section 408. The Library deposit under 
section 407 may do double duty as the deposit required for registration under section 408. 
Moreover, the incentives for registration are quite strong. Accordingly, the dichotomy 
between these two deposit provisions may not be quite as sharp as initially thought. 
 
a. Deposit for Library of Congress 
 
 The section 407 deposit, which "shall" be made by "the owner of copyright or of 
the exclusive right of publication" within three months after publication in the United 
States, is to consist of "two complete copies of the best edition" or, if the work is a sound 
recording, two complete phonorecords of the best edition, together with all 
accompanying printed material.94  The term "best edition" is defined in section 101 as 
"the edition, published in the United States at any time before the date of deposit, that the 
Library of Congress determines to be most suitable for its purposes."95 The Library has 
issued a policy statement on what constitutes such a "best edition," and this is now 
referred to in the implementing Copyright Office regulations.96  
 
 The material for use or disposition of the Library of Congress under section 
407(b) of the 1976 Act is to be deposited in the Copyright Office. Section 407(c) gives 
the Register of Copyrights authority to issue regulations exempting categories of material 
from the deposit requirements of this section, reducing the required copies or 
phonorecords to one, or, in the case of certain pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, 
                                                 
93 See, e.g., Garnier v. Andin Int'l, Inc., 36 F.3d 1214 (1st Cir. 1994).  By virtue of section 104A, however, 
the copyrights in foreign works published without notice before 1989 were restored, effective January 1, 
1995. 
94 17 U.S.C. § 407. 
95 Id. § 101. 
96 See 37 C.F.R. 02.19(b)(1), & app. B. The deposit requirement was sustained against a variety of 
constitutional attacks in Ladd v. Law & Technology Press, 762 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.1985). 
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providing for exemptions or alternative forms of deposit. The Register is also 
empowered, under section 408(c), to specify classes of works for purposes of deposit and 






 Registration under section 408 contrasts with the Library deposit provision under 
section 407 in the following respects: (1) it may be made not only by the owner of 
copyright but also the owner of any exclusive right thereunder rather than by the owner 
of the exclusive right of publication; (2) it applies to unpublished as well as published 
works; (3) it includes works published abroad; and (4) it may be made "at any time" 
during the subsistence of copyright. If the Library deposit under section 407 is 
accompanied by a prescribed application for registration along with a fee (currently $35 
for an electronic filing and $65 for a paper filing for most works), 97 it may be used to 
satisfy the deposit requirements of registration. The deposit copy must in most cases be a 
copy of the work in which copyright is claimed.98  
 
 The application for registration includes various items of information potentially 
required for computation of duration (e.g., year of death, year of creation, and year of 
publication if any), as well as the basis of ownership for persons other than authors and a 
brief, general statement of preexisting and added material used in any derivative work or 
compilation.99 
 
ii. Effect of Registration 
 
 Although the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988100 had as one of its 
objectives the elimination of the need to comply with statutory formalities, its principal 
focus was upon the elimination of the notice requirement for published works; it made 
few changes in the sections on deposit and registration as they were written in the 1976 
Act. The major change in this respect is that registration of copyright is no longer a 
prerequisite to an action for infringement of copyright "in Berne Convention works 
whose country of origin is not the United States." Most pertinently, this means that 
registration remains a prerequisite for an infringement action when the copyrighted work 
is first published in the United States or when the work, if unpublished, is by a United 
                                                 
97 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED COPYRIGHT FEE ADJUSTMENTS TO GO INTO 
EFFECT ON OR ABOUT AUGUST 1, 2009 (2009), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/fees2009.pdf. 
98 See Coles v. Wonder, 283 F.3d 798 (6th Cir. 2002) (1990 registration of 1982 song was invalid when the 
deposited copy was a "reconstruction" of the song from memory and without direct reference to the 
original; defendant is therefore awarded summary judgment, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). 
For certain types of works, it is permissible to deposit “identifying material” in lieu of a copy of the work, 
see 37 C.F.R. 202.20 and 202.21. 
99 See 17 U.S.C. § 409. 
100 Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C .). 
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States author.101 The 1988 Act thus creates what is known as a two-tier registration 
system, with works of U.S. origin being on the "lower" tier for purposes of litigation.102 
The requirement of pre-suit registration has been criticized, both because of the inferior 
position in which it places U.S. authors compared to foreign authors and because it is not 
clear that the requirement in fact induces a substantial number of incremental 
registrations.103   
 
In addition to seeking to encourage registration through the pre-suit requirement, 
the 1976 Act provided the following further incentives for timely registration: (1) 
registration within five years of first publication will ensure prima facie proof of validity 
of the copyright;104 (2) statutory damages and attorney's fees may be awarded only if 
registration is made prior to the commencement of the infringement.105  Given the high 
costs of litigation, the last-mentioned incentive is particularly important and indeed, for 
smaller litigants, may determine whether bringing an infringement action is financially 
viable.  It is important to emphasize that these incentives apply to all works regardless of 
their countries of origin.  As a practical matter, then, copyright registration promptly 
upon publication remains key to effective enforcement of copyright, even for non-U.S. 
works for which registration is not a prerequisite to suit.106 
                                                 
101 Id. § 411(a) (“no civil action for infringement shall be instituted until . . . registration of the copyright 
claim has been made in accordance with this title”).  The Second Circuit has rejected an attempt to devise a 
“blanket registration” doctrine akin to the “blanket notice” of  §  404(a) (see supra note 88), under which 
the registration of a copyright claim in a collective work would have covered the separate contents of the 
collective work as well.  See Morris v. Business Concepts, Inc., 283 F.3d 502 (2d Cir.2002). 
102 For an unsuccessful attempt to extend the pre-suit registration requirement to foreign works first 
published on a non-US website, on the ground that publication on the Internet occurs simultaneously in 
every country in which the work is accessible, thus rendering the work a “United States work” subject to 
sec. 411, see Moberg v. Leygues, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93402 (D. Del. 2009) (rejecting simultaneous 
publication theory as contrary to the Berne Convention  and US copyright law). 
103 See Robert Wedgeworth and Barbara Ringer, The Library of Congress Advisory Committee on 
Copyright Registration and Deposit – Letter and Report of the Co-Chairs, 17 Colum.-VLA J. L. & the Arts 
271, 310 (1993) (“one thing on which all of the Members of ACCORD appeared to agree was the lack of 
hard evidence concerning the effect of sections 411(a) and 412(a) as inducements to registration.”); id at 
273 (“no empirical proof that these three sections induce registration”). 
104 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). 
105 Id. § 412, which makes these remedies available even as to post publication infringements that 
commence before registration if the latter is made within three months after first publication. 
106 A related question, receiving sparse but contradictory treatment from courts, is how closely the work 
registered must correspond to the work allegedly infringed.  Compare Streetwise Maps v. VanDam, Inc., 
159 F.3d 739, 746-47 (2d Cir. 1998) (copyright registration of derivative work sufficient for copyright 
infringement action based on pre-existing work where plaintiff owned the copyrights for both the derivative 
and pre-existing work); RW Beck, Inc. v. E3 Consulting LLC, 577 F.3d 1133, 1143 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing 
Streetwise for same proposition), and Christopher Phelps & Assoc. LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 539 
(4th Cir. 2007) (emphasizing that registration of architectural design sufficient to provide standing for suit 
for “entire design,” including underlying, pre-existing, unregistered aspects of design), with Well-Made Toy 
Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int'l Corp., 354 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 2003) (registration of a claim on a pre-existing 
work confers jurisdiction over infringement claims regarding its derivative works).  But see Scholz Design 
v. Zinnerman, 2009 WL 2226048, *3--*4 (D. Md. 2009) (registration of underlying architectural design 
does not cover claim alleging infringement of derivative work design).  See also Newton v. Diamond, 349 
F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003) (musical composition defined by deposit copy of musical score, rather than by 
recorded performance of the work which, if set in musical notation, would have included more notes); 
Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures LC, 527 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2008) (claim of violation of 
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Whether or not they in fact increase the numbers of works registered, the 
registration incentives thus achieve a gatekeeper function, forestalling the claims of 
litigants, many of whom are likely to be individual authors.  As Pamela Samuelson and 
Tara Wheatley have observed: “The prompt registration requirement for statutory 
damages has not become a meaningful inducement to registration for all authors who 
value copyright protection, but rather a substantial boon to major copyright industry 
players—the commercial exploiters of copyrighted works whose rights largely derive 
from the Act’s work for hire rules or assignments from authors . . . . ‘Little guy’ authors 
thus, in theory, have the same strong legal rights as major copyright industry players, but 
effectively no way to get relief when their rights are infringed.” 107   
 
Nonetheless, this filtering of small claimants may not always prove a boon to the 
larger economic actors who may perceive the pre-suit requirement and limitations on 
statutory damages and attorneys fees as desirable means of screening out frivolous 
claims.108  For example, in a case involving the unauthorized digitization of the works of 
freelance journalists by the periodicals in which they had published their work, the 
Second Circuit held that the section 411 requirement that “registration of the copyright 
claim ha[ve] been made” before instituting an infringement action is “jurisdictional,” and 
that the court therefore did not have authority to approve a class action settlement which 
included compensation to authors of works whose authors had not registered them with 
the Copyright Office.109  As a result, the large newspaper and magazine publisher 
defendants in that case face the prospect of additional liability for copyright infringement 
should the excluded class members subsequently register their works and resume the 
litigation.  The US Supreme Court has heard an appeal from the decision.110   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
architectural work rejected when registration was made in category of pictorial, graphic and sculptural 
works); supra note 98 (discussing Coles v. Wonder).. 
107 Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright:  A Remedy in Need of Reform  
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1375604.  
108 See, e.g., Wedgeworth & Ringer, supra note 100, at 293 (fear that elimination of registration 
prerequisite to statutory damages and attorneys fees will engender a “flood of infringement claims”).  See 
also Amicus Br. for the United States, Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, No. 08-103 (June 2009) (registration 
requirement may filter out bad claims: “[T]he registration requirement may sometimes obviate the need for 
the court to rule on infringement claims at all, since a potential plaintiff whose registration application is 
denied by the Copyright Office may forgo suit rather than challenge the Register’s determination.”)] 
109 17 U.S.C. § 411. 
110 See In re Literary Works in Electronic Databases Copyright Litigation, 509 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2007), 
cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1523 (2009).  The Second Circuit’s decision appears to have inspired a particularly 
perverse interpretation of section 411 as barring an action for a declaration of non infringement if the work 
at issue has not been registered for copyright, see Stuart Weitzman, LLC v. Microcomputer Res., Inc., 542 
F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2008). 
While registration is a prerequisite to a suit for copyright infringement of a U.S. work, 
non-registration or improper registration does not prevent an action alleging violation of the § 1201 
provisions prohibiting circumvention of technological measures that protect access to or prevent copying of 
a copyrighted work. See, e.g., I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., 307 F. Supp. 2d 521 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004). 
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The statutory language requiring pre-suit registration, or its literal interpretation, 
produces other undesirable results as well.  For example, some courts have held that an 
author may not bring an infringement action until the registration in fact issues or is 
definitively refused by the Copyright Office.111  As a result, an author who promptly filed 
an application for registration, but the determination of whose application falls prey to 
backlogs in the Copyright Office, may not have her claims adjudicated until the 
Copyright Office acts on the application.112  Where the author has in fact sought to make 
the requisite public record of her claim, it is unclear what public policy such a wooden 
approach, whether it be Congress’ or the courts’, to registration advances. 
 
iii. Registration and Renewal of Copyright 
 
 While works created as of the January 1, 1978 effective date of the 1976 
Copyright Act enjoy a unitary term of the life of the author plus (since 1998) seventy 
years (or, for works made for hire, anonymous or pseudonymous works, now 95 years 
from first publication), works first published under the 1909 Act come within a 
transitional regime.  The 1976 Act initially preserved the renewal requirement for all 
works then in their first term of copyright.  Thus the author of a work first published in 
1960 would have had to register the work and renew its registration in order to obtain the 
second term of protection. In 1992, Congress provided for the “automatic renewal” of 
any work still in its first term; thus, for works first published between 1964 and 1977, the 
author’s failure to renew would no longer cast the work into the public domain.113 
 
3. Recordation of Transfers 
 
 The principal purpose of the registration formality is to facilitate ascertaining the 
copyright status and ownership of a work of authorship.  Registration will aid title-
searching, however, only to the extent it also accounts for subsequent transfers of 
                                                 
111 See, e.g., La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005); Corbis 
Corp. v. Amazon.com, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2004); Strategy Source, Inc. v. Lee, 233 F. Supp. 
2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002); Do Denim v. Fried Denim, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51512 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).   But see 
Tri Marketing v Mainstream Marketing, 2009 US Dist. LEXIS 42694 (D. Minn. 2009) (holding 
jurisdictional requirement met upon submission of application). 
112 In 2005, Congress amended the registration provisions to add § 408(f), Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218, 
221, allowing for “preregistration of works being prepared for commercial distribution.”  The provision 
assists enforcement of copyright in a “class of works that the Register determines has had a history of 
infringement prior to authorized commercial distribution.”  This class consists of motion pictures, sound 
recordings, musical compositions, literary works being prepared for publication in book form, computer 
programs (including videogames), or advertising or marketing photographs, see 37 C.F.R. § 202.16(b).  
The fee is $100 per work.  Id. § 201.3(c)(10). 
While it is possible to obtain rapid resolution of an application for registration, the expedited 
procedure involves substantial additional expense: where the standard fee is $65 (or $35 for an online 
filing), the fee for “special handling” is $760.  37 C.F.R. § 201.3(d) (2009).  Where the registration claim 
has been pending for at least six months, however, the Copyright Office will waive the additional fee for 
“special handling.”  See Fees for Special Handling of Registration Claims, 74 Fed. Reg. 39900-01 (August 
10, 2009). 
113 See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(2). In Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit upheld 
the automatic renewal amendment against a challenge that Congress’ abandonment of that copyright-
confiscatory formality altered the “traditional contours” of copyright in violation of the first amendment. 
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ownership.  Section 205 of the Copyright Act permits recordation of properly executed 
documents, and accords constructive notice to the recorded facts if:  
 
(c)(1) the document, or material attached to it, specifically identifies the work to 
which it pertains so that, after the document is indexed by the Register of 
Copyrights, it would be revealed by a reasonable search under the title or 
registration number of the work; and 
(2) registration has been made for the work.114 
 
Section 205 offers a further encouragement to take measures enhancing the utility of the 
Copyright Office’s records: in the event of a conflict of transfers, the first to record 
prevails.  Section 205, however, no longer accompanies these carrots with a stick.  In its 
original guise, section 205(d) of the 1976 Act made recordation a prerequisite to suit, but 
in the Berne-adherence amendments Congress deleted that requirement.  The Berne-
adherence amendments may in this instance have undermined one of the beneficial 
functions of formalities in a context in which the requirement may not in fact have been 
Berne-incompatible.115 
 
III.  Author-Friendly Formal Requirements? 
 
 Formalities have benefits.  If all works are protected, whether or not their authors 
have asserted rights in them, then an untold number of works whose authors neither 
maintain nor exploit them remain off limits to others’ exploitation, without profit to their 
creators.  Arguably, if the creator cannot take care enough to mark off her claims, then 
perhaps the public should be entitled to rely on the absence of notice to treat the work as 
unclaimed and free.  Law and economics reasoning might reinforce this conclusion: The 
creator is better able to assume the costs of notification than the public is to incur the 
costs of tracing right holders.  And those search costs can be high, particularly if the work 
is old, or if rights have been divided up among a variety of grantees (and their heirs).  A 
system that requires authors first to assert rights, through notice in distributed copies, or 
registration in a publicly accessible record, alerts the world to the author’s claims.  A 
system that obliges all transfers of rights to be recorded on the publicly accessible record 
facilitates tracing right holders.   
 
                                                 
114 17 U.S.C. § 205. 
115 See discussion, supra Part I.A.  Congress nevertheless was convinced that pre-suit recordation was 
Berne-incompatible.  S. REP. NO.100-352 (1988) (“The committee concludes that the recordation 
requirement of section 205(d) , at least as applied to foreign works originating in Berne countries, is 
incompatible with the Berne prohibition against formalities as preconditions for the ‘enjoyment and 
exercise’of copyright.”).  The conclusion, however, was a main point of contention in consideration of the 
Act.  Cf. The Berne Convention: Hearings on S. 1301 and S. 1971 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, 
Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 156 (1988) (statement of Ralph 
Oman, Register of Copyrights) (advocating for S. 1971, which did not eliminate pre-suit registration or 
recordation); H.R. REP. NO. 100-609 (1988) (“The [pre-suit recordation requirement] is Berne compatible 
because the failure to record does not lead to loss of the copyright---it merely regulates who may sue.”). 
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Notice, registration, and recordation of transfers thus are unquestionably 
beneficial and desirable; the problem, and the historical difference between the US and 
much of the rest of the world, lies in the consequences of failure to affix notice, register, 
or record a transfer of ownership.  Confiscating the copyrights of the non compliant, or 
barring their way to the courthouse door, may encourage adherence to formalities.116  But 
not all those who fail to fulfill these obligations do so because they do not care about 
their works.  Some lose track; some are ignorant of the obligation, particularly if they 
reside in foreign countries which do not impose formalities; some may find the fees 
prohibitive.  The last point is not trivial, particularly for individual creators.  Fees of $35 
(for electronic filings) to $65 (for paper filings) per work may not impose a significant 
financial burden if the author creates relatively few works.  For example, if the author 
produces one novel every year or two, the registration fee would seem unproblematic 
(and will in any event likely be paid by the publisher).  But if the author creates a large 
volume of works, for example, in the visual arts, the fees per work quickly add up.  The 
author who cannot afford to register all her works might wait to see which of her works 
attracts an audience before selecting which to register, but this strategy may prove 
perilous.  Not only does the cost of registration increase to $760 for an eve-of-litigation 
registration,117 but because statutory damages and attorneys fees are available only with 
respect to works that were registered within three months of publication, or before the 
infringement occurred, the author who waits to see what succeeds (and infringement can 
be evidence of success) will have lost the opportunity to obtain statutory damages and 
attorneys fees, and therefore may find she cannot afford to bring the suit.118   
 
Former Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer, whose understanding of US 
copyright formalities was second to none,119 proclaimed, regarding the registration 
                                                 
116 But see supra note 102. 
117 See supra note 111. 
118 See 17 USC § 412.  The Copyright Office regulations allow registration of certain works, for example, 
photographs published within 12 months of each other, as a group, for which one fee will apply.  37 C.F.R. 
§ 202.3(b)(10).  But waiting till twelve months have elapsed before registering the group may disqualify 
from statutory damages any photographs not registered before the infringement occurred.  It is, however, 
possible to register the photographs in three-month batches, see id. § 202.3(b)(10)(vi) (thereby also 
quadrupling the registration fees), thus taking advantage of the three-month grace period if the infringement 
occurs soon after publication.   
It also is not clear whether, when a work is registered as part of a group, the “work” for purposes of 
calculating statutory damages, is the group or its individual components.  If two works within a group are 
infringed, then the characterization of “the work” will either double or halve the basis for calculation of 
damages.  For examples of courts grappling to sort out the relevant work(s) from a group registration see 
Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1117 & n.8 (1st Cir. 1993) (“We are unable to 
find any language in either the statute or the corresponding regulations that precludes a copyright owner 
from registering the copyrights in multiple works on a single registration form while still collecting an 
award of statutory damages for the infringement of each work's copyright . . . the number of copyright 
registrations is not the unit of reference for determining the number of awards of statutory damages.”); Walt 
Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (assessing status as individual work by asking 
whether work could “live its own copyright life” (quoting Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 
F.2d 1096, 1105 (2d Cir. 1976))). 
119 See, e.g., Barbara Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N. Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 477 
(1977);  Ringer, supra note 31; see also Wedgeworth & Ringer, supra note 103; Doyle, Cary, McCannon & 
Ringer, supra note 47.  
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formality, “My philosophy has always been to reward authors for what they do, not to 
punish them for what they don’t do.”120  To obtain the social benefits of formalities 
without disadvantaging authors, it may be desirable to look beyond the current copyright 
law and the Copyright Office to alternatives to demarcating the public domain status of a 
work, and to establishing a traceable public record of copyright claims.  With respect to 
the former, under the default position of the copyright law (and of the Berne Convention) 
an original work of authorship is automatically protected; absence of notice or of 
registration does not entitle members of the public to conclude that the work is freely 
appropriable.  But if it is no longer necessary to assert rights through notice or other 
formalities in order to vest copyright, perhaps a formal relinquishment of rights might 
suffice to place a work in the public domain (or at least to enable a court to conclude that 
the author is estopped from enforcing her rights).  Thus, an unambiguous notice, such as 
the Creative Commons PD icon, might shift the default as to given works away from 
protected status.  The burden thus would not be on the author to acquire rights, but rather 
to disclaim them. 
 
With respect to rights clearance, the records of collective licensing societies, if 
open to the public, offer another source of information.  For works in digital formats, 
rightholders may embed “copyright management information” identifying the author and 
subsequent rightholders and setting out terms and conditions for licenses or permissions. 
Section 1202 of the Copyright Act protects this information against removal or 
tampering, although the statutory scope of protection has proved inadequate in several 
instances.121 The Creative Commons icons standardize certain kinds of copyright 
management information, marking off the scope of rights granted or withheld.  These 
markers perform a very useful notice function, identifying both the author and, within a 
limited set of choices, the nature of the uses permitted (commercial or non commercial; 
whether or not derivative works are authorized).  The omnibus nature of a CC license, 
however, makes it inappropriate for authors who wish to differentiate among licensees.  
Nor do the licenses directly assist authors who would seek to be paid for the works they 
distribute using the icons, because Creative Commons does not currently incorporate a 
payment mechanism.  On the other hand, an author’s selection of the “non commercial” 
license could be understood as an invitation to bargain with the author for the right to 
exploit the work commercially.122   
 
                                                 
120 Judith Nierman, Barbara Ringer: 1925-1909, COPYRIGHT NOTICES, April 2009 (Special Edition), at 1, 
5. 
121 See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 1999), aff’d., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 
2003) (declining to protect information about authorship, terms and conditions for exploiting work because 
plaintiff had not embedded the copyright management information in the images themselves, but had included 
it elsewhere on his webpages); Gordon v. Nextel Comms., 345 F.3d 922 (6th Cir. 2003) (failure to prove that 
removal of copyright notice was intentional and intended to facilitate infringement);  Jacobsen v Katzer, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115204, (ND Cal 2009) (defendants’ removal of names of the authors and copyright 
holder, title, reference to license, where to find the license and the copyright notices, renaming the files and 
referring to their own copyright notice and naming themselves as author and copyright owner: while the 
information was protectible under section 1202, facts alleged did not suffice to prove defendants’ 
knowledge and intent). 
122   Thanks to Prof. Jessica Litman for this observation. 
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Real improvements in title searching may well require amending the copyright act 
(with all the perils that entails) in at least three respects.  First, the author’s name should 
normally furnish the best starting point for ascertaining copyright ownership,123 
particularly if no publicly-accessible registry includes a given work’s first or subsequent 
copyright owner.  Effective title searching then depends on the work’s disclosure of the 
author’s name.  This may seem an obvious point, but appearances mislead: the point’s 
obviousness is premised on the expectation that the author’s name will in fact appear in 
connection with her work.  Or put another way, that the author enjoys an enforceable 
right of attribution.  In fact, outside the narrow realm of certain works of visual art,124 the 
U.S. copyright act does not give authors the right to name recognition.  And it seems that 
other federal or state sources (other than contracts) afford authors no recourse either.125  
Thus, Congress should include a general right of authorship attribution in the copyright 
act.126 
 
Second, we need a reliable record of transfers of copyright interests.  Congress 
might consider enacting a variety of incentives.  Were Congress to reimpose a pre-suit 
recordation requirement, that amendment should not violate the Berne Convention, 
because, as discussed earlier,127 a filing obligation that addresses who owns a copyright, 
rather than whether a copyright exists or may be enforced is not a prohibited “formality” 
in the sense of that treaty.  Arguably, barring the courthouse door to the copyright grantee 
does make the right unenforceable because anyone else is a stranger to the right, and 
therefore no one else can enforce it.  But the copyright act already provides one solution 
to that impasse: a “beneficial” copyright owner, for example, an author who transferred 
rights in return for royalties, has standing to bring an infringement action.128   On the 
other hand, an author who does not retain a continuing royalty interest may not be a 
“beneficial owner,” and therefore may lack standing.129 Congress could provide a more 
                                                 
123 Cf. Berne Conv. art. 15(1) (“In order that the author of a literary or artistic work protected by this 
Convention shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be regarded as such, and consequently be entitled 
to institute infringement proceedings in the countries of the Union, it shall be sufficient for his name to 
appear on the work in the usual manner. This paragraph shall be applicable even if this name is a 
pseudonym, where the pseudonym adopted by the author leaves no doubt as to his identity.”).  See also 
Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1474929   
(9/15/09 draft), (“ In a world of media conglomerates who purchase each other’s divisions, spin off product 
lines, and liquidate in bankruptcy at a dizzying rate, an author is now far easier to track down than her 
assorted assignees, their successors and their respective assignees.  It also seems more likely that an author 
will have kept track of what publisher bought her publisher than that a publisher will know how to find all 
of the authors whose contracts it assumed when it purchased the company that purchased the company that 
initially held the author’s contracts.”)  
124 See 17 USC § 106A (attribution rights in narrowly-defined “works of visual art”). 
125 See generally, Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in US Trademarks and Copyright Law, 
41 Hous. L. Rev. 263 (2004) (surveying sources of attribution rights and proposing amendment to the 
copyright act). 
126 For details of a proposed attribution right, see, e.g., id; Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights and 
Fixing the Dastar “Gap”, 2007 Utah L. Rev: 659, 699-703.  Contra, Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights: 
Attribution and Law, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 781. 
127 See supra, part IA. 
128 17 USC § 501(b). 
129 See, e.g., Cortner v. Israel, 732 F.2d 267, 271 (1984) (considering basic example of beneficial owner as 
“an author who had parted with legal title to the copyright in exchange for percentage royalties based on 
32 
radical and recordation-incentivizing solution: any exclusive rights that are transferred 
but not recorded within a stated period will revert to their grantors.  Requiring 
recordation as a prerequisite to suit, or indeed, as a condition of the validity of the 
grant,130 will, however, only assist title-searching to the extent that the recordation 
documents clearly define the scope of the grant of rights granted.  Thus, as a corollary to 
a reinforced recordation obligation, Congress might further provide that any ambiguities 
in the scope of the recorded grant will be interpreted against the grantee.   
 
Third, returning to the Copyright Office, while a central public register ideally 
should be the best, most complete source of information about the existence and 
ownership of copyrights, problems of practical implementation and of fairness to 
individual authors and smaller copyright owners caution against tying meaningful 
copyright enforcement to copyright registration.131  On the other hand, while pre-suit or 
pre-infringement registration requirements should therefore be eliminated, registration 
should be encouraged, notably because the recordation system here advocated depends on 
initial registration of the work in which rights are assigned or licensed.  For individual 
creators of large volumes of works for whom separate registrations become cumulatively 
prohibitive, one might consider establishment of annual registration accounts into which 
authors would prepay a substantially discounted blanket fee covering the year’s 
production so that each individual work upon publication could be registered without 
further payment.  The accounts would work like employee “flexible spending accounts”: 
at the start of the year, the author would pay in a sum which she believes will, at the 
discounted rate, cover the number of works she expects to register in the course of the 
year.  If she exhausts the deposited sum, she would pay additional fees for additional 
works; in order to avoid discouraging the registration of the additional works, the fees 
should still reflect the discount.  If she in fact registers fewer works than anticipated, the 
Copyright Office would keep the difference. 
 
An efficiently-working registration system may provide its own best incentive, 
but we are not likely to enjoy such a centralized system unless it is adequately staffed and 
supported by government funding.  Congressional intent to encourage registration must 
be implemented through efficient and low cost procedures that will enable the Copyright 
Office in fact to process promptly all the applications whose registration US public policy 
purports to favor.  At the moment, when the waiting time between filing for and issuance 
                                                                                                                                                 
sales or license fees” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 159, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Ad. News 5659, 5775)).  But see Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1145 
(2003) (holding that grant of royalties to creator of work-for-hire does not create beneficial ownership).  
Perhaps, however, the author’s inalienable termination right under sec. 203 might constitute sufficient 
continuing economic interest to qualify the author as a beneficial owner.  But cf. Hearn v. Meyer, 664 F. 
Supp. 832, 844 (1987) (finding merely possible reversion of royalty interest insufficient to create beneficial 
ownership). 
130 Cf. 17 USC § 204(a)(transfer of copyright ownership must be in writing and signed by the grantor). 
131 Arguably one person’s “fairness to individual authors” is another’s “encouragement of strike suits”, but 
there should be means, other than making lawsuits unaffordable for valid claimants, to discourage frivolous 
claims, such as the award of attorneys fees against the losing plaintiff, see 17 U.S.C. sec. 505 (court may 
award costs and attorneys fees to prevailing party). 
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of a registration exceeds 18 months for a paper filing,132 and averages 6 months for an 
electronic filing,133 if substantially more creators of works of authorship in fact sought to 
register them than do now, the already backlogged Copyright Office might well be 
incapable of handling them.   
 
Changing the registration system from one based on examination to an automatic 
repository of claims might reduce backlog, but it is not clear that this kind of streamlining 
would in fact improve the system.  Because the originality threshold for copyrightability 
is very low, 134 and the Copyright Office in fact registers the overwhelming majority of 
claims,135 one might contend that little would be lost, and time would be gained, were 
Congress to discard the examination.  If in fact the backlog were attributable to time 
copyright examiners spend ascertaining the originality of the works for which registration 
is sought, the proposal might be compelling, especially if in most cases minimal 
originality is apparent.  But it appears that examiners spend the bulk of their time 
addressing other aspects of the applications, particularly the internal consistency of the 
information the applicant supplied and its conformity with the information requested by 
the form.136  In other words, examiners devote most of their time to verifying that the 
applications establish a reliable public record of the claim and claimants.137   
 
The examination justifies the provision of the copyright act which makes 
registration within five years of first publication “constitute prima facie evidence of the 
validity of the copyright.”138  Prima facie validity serves at least two functions.  First, it 
places the burden on the defendant to disprove the work’s originality or the accuracy of 
the other information, such as the date of the work’s creation.  The practical significance 
                                                 
132 See Lindsey Layton, © 2009?  Wishful Thinking, Perhaps, as Backlog Mounts, WASHINGTON POST, 
May 19, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/05/18/AR2009051803171.html.  If electronic filings displace paper filings, the 
paper filing backlog may diminish. 
133 Copyright Office, eCO Online System (updated Aug. 5, 2009), at http://www.copyright.gov/register/.  
But see Copyright Office, Frequently Asked Questions (updated Nov. 5, 2009), at 
http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-what.html#certificate (estimating closer to 9 month waiting time). 
134 A “modicum of creativity” will suffice.  See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 
340, 346 (1991).  The standard of creativity for obtaining a patent is much higher, and requires substantive 
expertise on the part of the examiners.  See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (novelty); § 103 (non obviousness). 
135 See , e.g., Copyright Office Annual report, 2007 at 11 (“During fiscal year 2007, the Copyright Office 
received 541,212 claims to copyright covering well over a million works and registered 526,378 claims . . 
.”), http://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2007/ar2007.pdf. 
136 DONALD W. KING, ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF U.S. COPYRIGHT FORMALITIES 34-35 (1987) 
[hereinafter “COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS”] (distinguishing a thorough examination that delves deeply into 
originality and novelty from a “cursory examination to determine only that all technical requirements are 
carried out” and implying that the Copyright Office system tends toward the latter, in that it “does not 
generally examine works for artistic merit or newness, nor . . . does it ‘examine’ works to determine if the 
work is in fact an ‘original’ work”).  
137 COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 136, at  30 (1987) (emphasizing registration as means of providing 
“useful information to the public” and noting the Copyright Office’s “complete historical file, dating back 
to the first registration made at the office in 1870”). 
138 See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c); § 401(a) makes clear that the registration’s prima facie value as to the 
copyrightability of the subject matter  and validity of the information contained in the registration results 
from the examination process. 
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of this function depends on whether the allocation of the burden to the defendant in fact 
changes the outcome when originality is in dispute.139  If courts in effect address 
originality de novo, the evidentiary advantages of registration would lie principally with 
respect to proof of dates of creation and publication; in cases where the dates of creation 
or dissemination of plaintiff’s and defendant’s works are at issue,140 assignment of the 
burden of proof can make a difference.141   
 
The second function of presumptive validity may carry even more practical 
consequences.  A Cease and Desist letter to which a copy of a registration is appended 
may be far more effective than an unaccompanied demand.142  The registration represents 
a government determination that the work in question crosses the threshold of 
copyrightability and that the author is the initial copyright owner.  If the registration were 
simply an unverified record of the author’s assertions, it is not clear that it would provide 
admonitory benefits.  Thus, even were registration no longer a prerequisite to statutory 
damages and attorneys fees, authors (as well as the general public) still would be better 
served by a credible public record of their works than without one.  Voluntary 
compliance with formalities accordingly promotes the interests of both authors and their 
audiences.  But, without a smoothly-functioning registration system, the current US 
system of de facto mandatory formalities simply penalizes authors without sufficiently 
advancing the public record.   
                                                 
139 Compare., Sapon v. DC Comics, 2002 WL 485730 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (despite plaintiff’s registration for 
his “Black Bat” allegedly infringed by DC Comics’ Batman, defendant had little difficulty establishing lack 
of originality); Past Pluto Productions Corp. v. Dana, 627 F. Supp. 1435 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (despite 
plaintiff’s registration for his foam hat of Statue of Liberty Crown allegedly infringed by defendant’s foam 
hat of Statute of Liberty Crown, defendant had little difficulty establishing lack of originality), with, 
Maljack Productions, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1416, 1428 n.9 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding “UAV’s 
mere supposition, unsupported by evidence, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of validity of the 
certificate of copyright”); Stanislawski v. Jordan, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1109 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (appearing 
to give significant weight to registration as evidence that plaintiff’s works were not derivative). 
140 See, e.g., Repp  v Webber, 132 F.3d 882 (2d. Cir. 1997) (counterclaimant Andrew Lloyd Webber 
asserted that plaintiff’s song was copied from earlier song by Webber). 
141 See COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 136, at 105 (in 1987 study, in 80% of lawsuits, prima facie 
evidentiary value of registration  was  found to be “very important” (59%) or “somewhat important” (21%) 
in settling or terminating the lawsuit.  “When prima facie evidence supplied by the copyright registration 
was challenged, the challenge was not successful 83 percent of the time.”) 
142 Id. (in 71% of non litigated disputes, prima facie evidentiary value of registration  was  found to be 
“very important” (46%) or “somewhat important” (25%) in resolving the dispute). 
